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ABSTRACT
Understanding the process of consumers' buying decisions is not intuitively obvious
from the way it appears. Before we come up with any acceptable account of the
process, we should learn more about consumers' traits as well as the characteristics
of the goods or services they intend to purchase. The goal of this study is to establish
the alignment of consumers' buying decisions with information choice and
determine why consumers may or may not make buying decisions compatible with
reviewer comments. To explain the reality of multiple consumer equilibria, the
paper draws on the four information choice theories: inattentiveness, rational
inattention, information markets, and costly precision. Based on the theories, this
paper considers why consumers may arrive at different buying decisions through
their choice and processing of signals from consumer product reviews though the
reviews are identical and considering that, in general, higher product ratings are
associated with higher sales. Overall, this paper contributes to a better
understanding of why consumers arrive at different buying decisions from the same
pool of online consumer product reviews.
KEYWORDS: information choice, signal, noise, consumer buying decisions,
product reviews

INTRODUCTION
As consumers get into a process of purchasing a product or service, they go through
several stages, one of which is identification and observation of the product
information sources (Engel et al. 1968). Consumers browse the internal and
external environment to identify information sources and choose an information set
to observe (Bunn 1993). Therefore, the final purchase decision can be influenced
heavily by the observed, positive or negative information, especially from other
customers, and by the level of motivation to refuse or accept the information (Kotler
et al. 2009; Nielsen 2016; Wang and Cole 2016). For example, Wang and Cole
(2016) found that the consumer's age, level of expertise, and information type
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contained in product descriptions have different effects on consumers' evaluation
of products. In other words, the final purchase decision can be influenced greatly
by consumers' choice of information and the way they see the signals from the
chosen information.
In buying decision processes in today’s culture, consumers almost totally rely on
online reviews. A recent study found that online consumer reviews aside from
personal recommendations play a major role in purchase decisions (Paul and
Hogan, 2015). As consumers search for product information for their purchase
decisions, they often have access to a whole slew of online product reviews from
other consumers. Those online consumer reviews are readily available along with
other consumer-empowering product information, including third-party reviews,
email newsletters, and personal recommendations generated by recommender
systems. The effect of third-party reviews (Akdeniz et al. 2014; Chen and Xie 2005)
and the role of email newsletters (Hartemo et al. 2016) have been studied
extensively). Many studies have also been conducted on the role of online
recommender systems (Baum and Spann 2014; Zhijie 2014) and the positive
influence reputational and institutional mechanisms can have on consumer trust (Ba
and Pavlou 2002; Fang et al. 2014; Gefen and Pavlou 2008). In addition, many
studies have examined the effects of online customer reviews on purchase decisions
from numerous different perspectives, such as the characteristics of reviewers
(Forman et al. 2008; Salehan and Kim 2016; Smith et al. 2005) and the temporal
effect of reviews (Li and Hitt 2008). Previous studies have also found that online
consumer reviews, in both the macro and micro levels, can have a positive impact
on sales (Chen et al. 2008; Chen and Xi 2008; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006;
Clemons et al. 2006; Mudambi and Schuff 2010). Particularly, Chen et al. (2008)
found that, at a disaggregate level, consumers' evaluations of individual reviews are
affected by both the reviewer quality in an online community and the helpfulness
of the review to the community measured by the content quality. As past research
found, online customer reviews influence consumer purchase decisions and higher
product ratings are associated with higher sales. One area in need of further study,
though, is why not all consumers follow suit. In other words, why do consumers
get different signals from the same reviews and end up with different purchase
decisions? For example, many online consumer reviews read like "This book is a
masterpiece. I feel fortunate that I discovered it before most other people. I
discovered it by reading an extremely negative review for this book [emphasis
added] …" (Gary 2015), "'Suicide Squad' Opens at Number One Film as Fans
Ignore Critics [emphasis added]" (Sakoui 2016), and many others (see Streitfeld
2016). Furthermore, consumers are more likely to buy a product based on the
quantity of reviews, rather than the quality of what the reviews say (Powell et al.
2017). These seemingly erratic behaviors of consumers call for a study on the
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relationships between online consumer reviews and consumers' final purchase
decisions from a different vantage point.
Between the reviews posted on retail websites (e.g., www.amazon.com), social
media (e.g., www.reddit.com), expert reviews (e.g., www.cnet.com), and crowdsourced review sites (e.g., www.angieslist.com), people are awash in product or
service information, most of it accessible at negligible cost. However, humans have
only a finite capacity to process all of it. While the average consumer has access to
a large amount of online reviews when he/she is in a buying decision process
(Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006), not all the reviews can receive equal attention. How
carefully does a consumer read online reviews from other consumers before making
a final purchase decision? How many reviews does a consumer read from the
strangers? In other words, depending on the types of information choices and the
amount of information consumers choose to observe, different consumers can
arrive at different purchase decisions even if those decisions are not the best ones
in light of the reviews. The incongruent purchase decisions may be affected by
either idiosyncratic signal noises or common signal noises or both. Idiosyncratic
signal noises or independent signal realization (Myatt and Wallace 2012) fall into
consumers' cognitive domain or characteristics. They include consumers'
perception on the review authenticity (Kugler 2014), consumers' previous
knowledge or experiences with the products or services contradictory to the reviews
(Park and Kim 2008), increased awareness even with negative reviews (Berger et
al. 2016), positive views as good products or services regardless of their reputations
(Monks 2015; Thaler 1980), perceived information diagnosticity of a review (Jiang
and Benbasat 2004 2007; Kempf and Smith 1998; Pavlou and Fygenson 2006;
Pavlou et al. 2007), and social learning (Powell et al. 2017). On the other hand,
common signal noises or common signal realization (Myatt and Wallace 2012) are
related to product characteristics, such as the product type (experience vs search),
product popularity, product category (hedonic vs utilitarian), hype around the
product, and inaccurate information about the product (Black 1986; Mudambi and
Schuff 2010; Zhu and Zhang 2010).
This implies that consumers do not always choose to buy products with the most
favorable online consumer reviews. Products that do not receive stellar reviews may
still be purchased by consumers depending on the consumers' types of information
choices, the signals they choose to observe, and signal noises. From a different point
of view, products with relatively higher positive online consumer reviews may not
entirely crowd out the competing products that have relatively lower reviews. As
digital technologies accelerate, consumers have access to overwhelming amounts
of information as never before—from other proprietary and public sources, not just
from online consumer reviews. This is profoundly changing the strategic landscape:
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altering the structure where business competes, redefining the way in which
business operates, and, ultimately, transforming performance across industries (Hirt
and Willmott 2014). Indeed, providing and responding to online consumer reviews,
either online or blended, have become an important strategic component of many
businesses (Chevalier et al. 2016). Given the strategic importance of consumer
reviews and those being an important resource for consumers making purchase
decisions, we draw on information choice theory and on past research to explain
why different types of information choices can bring multiple different purchase
decisions on different consumers. Overall, this paper contributes to a better
understanding of why consumers arrive at different buying decisions after reading
the same pool of online consumer product reviews.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews
literature related to information choice and processing. We then present a
theoretical framework as common ground for applying the four information choice
theories to consumer buying decision process. In the next section, each information
choice theory elaborates why consumers can arrive at different buying decisions
based on the same product reviews. In the last section, we conclude the article with
implications of the four different information choice theories on the effect of
reviews on consumer buying decisions.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
In neoclassical economics, consumer behavior is explained by utility maximization.
The objective of the consumer is to choose a product that maximizes his/her utility
under the given constraints, including tastes, budget, and prices. Meanwhile, the
economics of information proposes that consumers often must make purchase
decisions with partial information when they do not have complete information on
product quality, seller credibility, and the available substitutes. This lack of
information introduces uncertainty in a buying decision process, therefore,
consumers seek additional information to reduce their uncertainty. However,
seeking information incurs both internal and external search costs (Smith et al.
1999). The major external costs are the monetary costs of obtaining the information
and the opportunity cost of the time spent on searching. Internal costs include
sorting and choosing the incoming signals and integrating them with the consumer's
prior knowledge. Search costs are not the same for all consumers; they are often
determined by the consumer's socioeconomic background and level of performance
in the search (Smith et al. 1999; Stigler 1961).
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The key objective of the consumer's buying decision process is to make a decision
close to the true state (optimal decision that carries a maximum utility) and close to
the average action of other consumers or, at least partially, to increase decision
accuracy by reducing uncertainty (Myatt and Wallace 2012; Hellwig et al 2012).
For reduced uncertainty, consumers can search for more information while
acknowledging that an additional search may not even out added benefits with extra
costs (Stigler 1961). Consumers can use decision and comparison aids (Wang and
Benbasat 2009) and numerical content ratings, such as the star rating (Poston and
Speier 2005), to reduce search costs and improve the buying decision process.
Consumers can also utilize various types of information choices to determine the
information sets and signals to observe, and they can process the signals with or
without the influence of signal noises to take an action (Myatt and Wallace 2012;
Reis 2006; Sims 2003; Veldkamp 2006). That is, their types of information choices
and the context of information processing under uncertainty can increase decision
accuracy or bring multiple decision results—either all consumers, no consumers,
or some consumers follow other consumers' decisions as manifested in their online
reviews.
Information, Signal, and Signal Noise
In information economics, information is a key player in economic decisions (Allen
1990; Arrow 1996; de Langhe et al. 2016; Hellwig and Veldkamp 2009).
Information is often hard to trust; it may be functional or dysfunctional due to
different cognitive processes or signal noises; it can be endogenous or exogenous;
or it can be considered a commodity because its acquisition can be costly. It is
possible for consumers in a purchase decision process to have a certain degree of
information or knowledge about the product under consideration. Nevertheless,
they desire information because it helps them reduce the uncertainty of taking
action by complementing or substituting their prior knowledge (or, more generally,
by reducing information asymmetry). Uncertainty is a state that arises when a
consumer is engaged in a decision making process based on less than perfect
information or knowledge (Downey and Slocum 1975). In the communications
perspectives, information is a signal; an observed random variable that is not
independent of unobserved variables that affect economic decisions (Arrow 1996).
Put differently, signals are observable characteristics attached to a piece of
information or information set that can be manipulated by its source (Spence 1973).
The signals consumers observe depends both on the availability of an observable
pool of information known as an information set and on the consumers’ choice of
what to learn. Consumers who want to replicate other consumers’ behavior want
the knowledge that their predecessor has. The opposite is also true. Consumers who
choose to act when other consumers choose not to act want more information
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regarding not acting.(Hellwig and Veldkamp 2009). This involves searching for
information from various sources. Each information source provides informative
signals with some source-specific noise, and a consumer observes the signals with
some additional noise of his or her own (Myatt and Wallace 2012).
Black (1986) defined noise as something that is the opposite of information.
Consumers as economic agents sometimes make decisions on information in the
usual way. They seem to maximize expected returns or obtain maximum utilities,
at least close to the true state. On the other hand, agents sometimes commit
transactions on noise as if it were information. These transactions end up incorrect
or suboptimal decisions. In a different perspective, Black defined noise as what
makes agents' observations imperfect. It keeps consumers from knowing the
expected return on their purchases. In general, noise keeps consumers from
knowing what, if anything, they can do to achieve better decision outcomes. He
also viewed noise as the arbitrary element in expectations and unknown
information. As another point of view, the noise from an information source (sender
noise), which is error contained in the source, determines the underlying accuracy
of the signals, and the noise from a signal observer (receiver noise), which is error
either in observing signals or in acquiring or absorbing signals, determines the
signal clarity. The sender noise is a common or external noise, and the receiver
noise is an idiosyncratic or internal noise (Myatt and Wallace 2012; Wu and Newell
2003). This suggests that making a buying decision depends heavily on
conceptualizations—consumers' internal, mental models of themselves and of the
things with which they are interacting—they bring to the task (Friestad and Wright
1994; Noman 1983).
Knowledge and Mental Model
As past studies on online consumers have found, purchase decisions are greatly
influenced by the review system and the consumer's mental model of the review
system. The review system consists of the available online consumer reviews on
the product under consideration, the characteristics of the information contained in
the reviews, and an appropriate representation of the system in the sense of linking
the buyer and seller that is accurate, consistent, and complete. Mental models
naturally evolve through interaction with a review system (Norman 1983). These
models are not technically accurate as they are continually modified to get to a
workable result and constrained by such things as consumers' decision-making
styles, prior product knowledge, and the limitations of individual's information
processing capacity (Friestad and Wright 1994; Norman 1983; Miller 1956).
Specifically, Norman (1983) found that the mental models people bring to perform
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a task are not precise and sophisticated. They are fractional and contain areas of
uncertainties, inconsistencies, imprecision, and idiosyncratic oddities.
Besides, people often feel uncertain of their own knowledge—even when it is, in
fact, complete and correct—and their mental models include accounts of the degree
of certainty they feel for different aspects of their knowledge. Thus, a person's
mental model includes knowledge or beliefs that are considered to be of doubtful
validity. Some of this leads to seemingly correct decisions, even if they make no
sense. People's doubts and various degrees of certainty about their knowledge
control their behavior and make them exercise extra caution when making decisions
under the available information set, with the chosen signals out of the available
information set, and with the limited capacity for information processing within a
background of noise (Norman and Bobrow 1975). This is especially likely to be the
case when a person is knowledgeable about the category of the product under
consideration and has extended experience with review systems (Wang and Cole
2016; Zhu and Zhang 2010). Therefore, from past research on online consumers
and mental models, we can state that an online buying decision process is heavily
influenced by the consumer's information choice. It is in turn dependent on
information costs (e.g., search and acquisition costs), review system (e.g., signal
and signal noise embedded in online consumer reviews), product characteristics
(e.g., product type, such as search, experience, hedonic and utilitarian goods), and
consumer characteristics (e.g., mental model formed upon previous experience and
prior knowledge).
Information Choice Theories
Economic activities, such as purchasing, involve making decisions. To make better
decisions, economic agents, including consumers, need information. Thus, the
problem of choice, acquisition, and observation of information has become a key
issue in information economics. Past research in information economics has
identified four major types of information choices: inattentiveness (Reis 2006),
rational inattention (Sims 2003), information markets (Veldkamp 2006), and costly
precision (Myatt and Wallace 2012).
As past economics literature has extensively examined (see Smith et al. 1999), it is
costly for a rational consumer to acquire and process information to make an
optimal purchase decision that maximizes his/her utility subject to such standard
constraints as budget, prices, and preferences. Obtaining information, processing
and interpreting it, and deciding optimal action are all costly in money and time.
Moreover, the entire process may be annoying or frustrating for some consumers.
Consequently, a consumer does not pay attention to all the information. This type
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of information choice is called the inattentiveness (Reis 2006). The consumer
simply acts as if he/she was living under perfect certainty. There are a couple of
properties of inattentiveness (Reis 2006). The smaller the costs of acquisition,
processing, and interpretation of information plus the costs of planning an optimal
action, the more a consumer will be inattentive to information. In addition, the
lower is the risk faced by the consumer and the lower her aversion to this risk, the
more he/she will be inattentive to information. This implies that if the overall costs
of information and planning are not too small, inattentiveness is optimal behavior
(Reis 2006). Meanwhile, another stream of research on information choice puts
more weight on the finite capacity of consumers in processing information, not just
costs.
Given a physical constraint on the rate at which people can process information,
which is known as the Shannon’s channel capacity (Cover and Thomas 2006),
consumers decide what signals to observe from the chosen information sources.
They also decide how much attention to devote to different signals so that they can
make purchase decisions close to the true state in the Bayesian sense and close to
the average action of other consumers (Myatt and Wallace 2012). Rational
inattention theory incorporates such limits in individual's information processing
capacity (Sims 2003). It does not assume a symmetry of reactions to positive or
negative information. The theory focuses on how consumers allocate attention, one
of the scarce resources, when they make economic decisions. That is, consumers as
decision makers have a limited amount of attention so that they have to decide how
to allocate it. For example, there is a large amount of information on the product
available to consumers, but due to limited attention, it is simply impossible for the
consumers to attend to all that information. Therefore, consumers must choose
which information to attend to more carefully, which information to attend to less
carefully, and which information to ignore (Sims 2003). With the view of the rate
of information flow as the rate of uncertainty reduction, Sims (2003) modelled
attention as an information flow and limited attention as a bound on information
flow. The more attention a consumer allocates to information, the less uncertainty
he/she gets. Thus, limited attention simply imposes a limit on the signal-to-noise
ratio in the signal on the subject of a purchase decision. Yet, another branch of study
on information theory, dubbed information markets by Veldkamp (2006), focuses
on the non-rival nature of information and access to multiple information markets.
In economics, rivalry is used to describe a characteristic of a good, including a
physical good or a nonphysical good such as information. A good can be
characterized on a continuum between rival to non-rival. A good is considered nonrival if, for any level of production, the marginal cost of production is zero or nearly
zero. Non-rivalry does not mean that the total production costs are low. It is just
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concerned about the marginal cost of production (Cornes and Sandler 1986). The
non-rival nature of information, coupled with free entry in the information market,
can reduce the uncertainty over a decision—making process, and the riskier the
perceived consequence of a decision, the more valuable the public information
becomes because it can be used both to predict the true state and to predict others'
actions (Veldkamp 2006). Thus, the marginal value of public information exceeds
the marginal value of private knowledge. When a decision entails a low risk, the
degree of the complementarity or substitutability of the information diminishes, or
the information can be completely ignored (Veldkamp 2006). Depending on the
amount of consumers' knowledge (idiosyncratic noise) or, put differently,
depending on the degree of complementarity of information about the product
under purchase consideration, observation of the information may or may not
increase the dispersion of the consumers' decisions. Highly dispersed decisions
imply that consumers do not follow suit. For example, when consumers have a
lower degree of knowledge about products, risk-averse consumers may purchase
only the products with the highest ratings and numbers because the consumers
prefer products that they are informed about. This is more likely in a multiple
information markets setting where access to the markets is free and marginal cost
of producing information is very low or even zero (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980;
Romer 1990; Veldkamp 2006).
The fourth information choice theory, called the costly precision is proposed by
Myatt and Wallace (2012) and centers around the underlying accuracy of an
informative signal (how precisely it identifies the true state) and clarity of the
informative signal (how easy it is to understand). According to Myatt and Wallace
(2012), when there is a collection of information sources accessible to economic
agents such as consumers, the informative signal from each source comes with
some source-specific noise named sender noise. It determines the signal's
underlying accuracy. A consumer then observes this signal with some additional
consumer-specific noise named receiver noise, which determines the signal's
clarity. Receiver noise is reduced if a consumer listens to the signal with great care,
which of course incurs a greater cost. Sender noise is originated from an
information source, while receiver noise comes from error either in observation or
in understanding of a signal. Then, to which information sources do consumers
listen, and how carefully do consumers choose to listen to each informative signal?
The answers are determined by the degree of precision of accuracy and clarity, as
well as the cost of information against its benefit (Wyatt and Wallace 2012). The
costly precision theory concludes that the clearest signals receive attention, even if
they have poor underlying accuracy and that the number of signals consumers
observe decreases as the complementarity of other consumers' actions rises. This is
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because decision-makers look for actions that are not only matched to some
unknown true state of the world but also matched to the actions taken by others.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The above reviews on the concepts and the information choice theories imply that
consumers who must make buying decisions under uncertainty and wish to
maximize their utilities would consider the actions of other consumers. Then the
purchasing consumers make purchase decisions close to the true state based on
some inference from their mental models of other consumers' actions and
knowledge of the product under consideration. Intuitively, as in the Keynesian
beauty contest (Keynes 1936), the consumers choose what information to observe
about the true state before they make purchase decisions. Different types of
information choices by the consumers result in different cost functions for the
information choice set and different constraints on the signal choice set.
Specifically, under the unknown true state s, which is drawn from a prior
distribution of the random variable s and a series of signals about s, consumers
indexed by a continuum of measure one observe their chosen signals and
simultaneously take an optimal action or make a decision. In other words,
consumers choose an action ai to minimize the expected squared distance between
the weighted average 𝑎̅ of the individual consumer's action and the unknown true
state s, minus any cost c of acquiring information, where c is expressed in units of
expected utility:
(1) u(ai, 𝑎̅, s) = − (ai − r𝑎̅ − (1 − r)s)2 − c.
The coefficient r (which is always less than 1) measures the complementarity and/or
substitutability of consumers' decisions. A positive, higher r means more
complementarity. If the coefficient r is greater than 0, decisions are
complementary—that is, best decisions are increasing in the actions of other
consumers. If r < 0, decisions are strategic substitutes. If s is a common, well-known
state (i.e., if there is no or virtually no alternative choice), the best action of ith
consumer is ai = (1 - r)s + r𝑎̅, and ai = 𝑎̅ = s constitutes the unique decision.
Let Ki represent the information set including the chosen signals s. The first-order
condition of (1) with regard to ai turns out ai = E[r𝑎̅ + (1 – r)s | Ki]. The utility
function (1) is then simply a conditional variance u(ai, 𝑎̅, s) = Var(r𝑎̅ + (1 – r)s |
Ki) – c. The conditional variance can be decomposed into the variances of individual
terms of the expression r𝑎̅ + (1 – r)s and a covariance term, which constitutes the
expected utility of ith consumer:
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(2) E[u(ai, 𝑎̅, s)] = – (r2Var[𝑎̅ | Ki] + 2r(1 – r)Cov[𝑎̅, s | Ki] + (1 – r)2Var[s | Ki]) – c.
Because (2) is the expected utility of a consumer who acts optimally after observing
his chosen signals S, it is the payoff function for his/her information choice. This
means that to figure out the value of any information choices, it is sufficient to know
what the information implies for the three moments: (1) the conditional variance of
the state (i.e., the variance of the true state given the information set); (2) the
conditional variance of the average action (i.e., the variance of the average action
given the information set); and (3) the covariance between the average action and
the true state.
Taking Noises into Account
As Black (1986) defined, noise is something opposite of information. Consumers
can be exposed to either common noise or idiosyncratic noise or both. Suppose
there is a k-dimensional vector of common signal noises p, distributed with mean
= 0 and a variance, independent of the true state s. Besides, for each consumer, there
is a l-dimensional vector of idiosyncratic signal noises qi, distributed with mean =
0 and a variance, independent of the true state s and p. This introduction of noises
at the individual consumer level gives an n-dimensional vector of potentially
observable signals to each consumer, denoted by zi, including the two types of
noise.
(3)

zi = 1n.s + Dp + Bqi,

where 1n is an n x 1 vector of ones and D and B are n by k and n by l matrices of
coefficients with rank n, respectively. Therefore, the consumer i's jth signal can be
represented as 𝑧𝑗𝑖 = s + dj pj + bj 𝑞𝑗𝑖 . This composition of individual consumer's
signals allows for arbitrary correlation in signals across consumers. Specifically, by
setting either the row vector d or the row vector b equal to zero, we can define a
spectrum of signals between two extremes: pure private signals and pure public or
common signals. As dj + bj approaches infinity, signal j gets unobserved or
uninformative because noise becomes a dominant component of the consumer i's
jth signal. Consequently, the consumer's cost of information is determined by a
function c(d, b), where the cost decreases as d and/or b gets larger.
Updating Priors Beliefs to Posterior Beliefs
Individual consumer i's signals are an unbiased predictor of the true state s with
variance bj2 + dj2. Following the Bayes’ Law, consumers' posterior beliefs E[s | Ki],
Var[s | Ki], and E[𝑎̅ | Ki] are reversely related to the variance bj2 + dj2 and the
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parameters of the true state s distribution N(µ, 𝜏𝑠−1), where 𝜏𝑠−1 (the reciprocal of
the variance) represents the precision of the true state s (i.e., the width of the
distribution of s), and Ki denotes the information set including the chosen signals s.
In particular, the update of the average action 𝑎̅ by consumers depends on the
characteristics of the signal they observe. In case of symmetric information choices,
where all consumers choose to observe signals with the same precision and,
therefore, choose the same action rules, signal outcomes and realized actions may
differ. This can be shown as ai = ϒ0 µ + ∑𝑗 ϒj 𝑧𝑗𝑖 , where ϒ0 denotes the weight on
priors in actions, ϒ denotes the weight on the signal if only one signal is observed,
and ϒ j denotes the weight on signal j ≥ 1 when multiple signals are observed. Since
qi (idiosyncratic noise of the i's consumer) is independent across consumers, 𝑎̅ = ϒ0
µ + ∑𝑗 ϒj (s + dj pj). Thus, the posterior beliefs about average actions are
summarized by
(4)

E[𝑎̅ | Ki] = ϒ0 µ + ∑𝑗 ϒj (E[s | Ki] + djE[pj | Ki])

INFORMATION CHOICES AND BUYING DECISIONS
A consumer's learning about the true state s and the consequent actions can be
explained by many different information choice theories, each of which is a case of
(3) with varying restriction on d and b. In this section, we discuss the implications
of the restriction for the three statistics (i.e., Var[s | s], Var[𝑎̅ | 𝑠], and Cov[𝑎̅, s | s])
and the information choice equilibria. In Bayesian statistical inference, a prior is a
probability distribution of an uncertain quantity that would express one's beliefs
about the quantity before some evidence is considered.
Inattentiveness and Buying Decisions
Let us assume two extreme cases where a consumer can choose one of two options:
observe no signal (d + b = ∞) or observe s exactly (d = b = 0) at a cost c. The first
option means that all signals are either purely private or common. The second
option indicates that the signals are not observed or unattended. In both case, the
precision tends to infinity. Reis (2006) called this information choice the
inattentiveness, where consumers choose their own information update paths at
some intervals and hence adjust their actions infrequently.
Since, in this case, informed consumers know the true state s and other consumers’
information sets, they can deduce average actions. Thus, Var[s | s] = Var[𝑎̅ | 𝑠] =
Cov[𝑎̅, s | s] = 0. Let β be the subset of consumers who choose to update
information. According to the first order condition, uninformed consumers should
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choose ai = μ, and informed consumers should choose ai = (1 − ϒ) μ + ϒs, where
ϒ = (1 − r)/(1 − rβ) and r measures either substitutability (r < 0) or complementarity
(r > 0). The statistics for uninformed consumers are Var[s] = τs−1, Var[𝑎̅] = ϒ 2 τs−1
and Cov[𝑎̅, s] = ϒ τs−1. Thus, the inattentiveness theory can bring about three types
of possible equilibria: either all consumers, no consumers, or some consumers
acquire full information by update. The prevailing equilibrium depends on the
information cost c, the degree of complementarity r, and prior precision τs.
Proposition 1: With fixed costs of information update and complementarity in
consumer actions (r > 0), either all consumers, no consumers, or some consumers
act in line with the given product reviews if c ∈ ((1 − r)2τs−1, τs−1). When r > 0, a
consumer's buying decision is based on the reviews. When r < 0, a buying decision
becomes a strategic one unconcerned about the reviews.
Rational Inattention and Buying Decisions
Some reviews such as bought reviews or puff pieces tend to be biased and
correlated. However, in many cases, individual reviews (signals) about the true state
s are uncorrelated across consumers (D = 0). Suppose the consumer observes a
single signal. Then, zi = s + bi qi where qi ∼ N(0, 1) are independent across i. Each
consumer chooses bi to maximize expected utility (2), subject to a cost function
c(bi) that is decreasing in bi (the coefficient of the idiosyncratic signal noise). Sims
(2003) described this kind of information choice using rational inattention theory,
where a consumer can access all information. Nevertheless, consumers' limited
information-processing ability causes them to introduce noise to whatever they
observe. Each consumer creates his/her own noise, independent of any other
consumer. Having d = 0 means that, as consumer i observes more information,
Var[s | Ki], Var[𝑎̅ | Ki], and Cov[𝑎̅, s | Ki] fall together by the same proportion, where
and Ki denotes the information set including the chosen signals s by a consumer.
If consumers acquire more information, they put more weight on the more precise
private signals (idiosyncratic noises) when forming their actions. Thus, (1 − ϒ0)
increases because as consumers acquire more information, the weight on their
priors in actions decreases. When actions are complements (r > 0), consumer i
acquires more information to decrease Var[s | Ki]. This is a complementarity in
information acquisition. However, this complementarity does not seem to explain
various buying decisions made by consumers either in line with the reviews or not
(Hellwig and Veldkamp 2009). The decision based on one private signal’s precision
would be unique. With two or more private signals and a cost function of the sum
of the signal precisions, there will always be multiplicity because a consumer would
be indifferent between any signal precisions that have the same sum. Therefore,
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multiple decisions exist. When the true state s and the signals are normally
distributed, rational inattention prescribes that the amount of information processed
1
is M = 2 ln(| Var(s) | / | Var(s | Ki ) |), which leads to any arbitrary cost function
c(M).
Rational inattention has the property of diminishing marginal cost of precision: (1)
Assuming s is a scalar, if signal precision increases by a one-unit, posterior
precision 1/Var(s | Ki ) increases by one unit. This means that: (1) the marginal cost
of precision decreases proportionally as Var(s) decreases and explains that why
learning about something unfamiliar (high Var(s)) is costly; (2) Var(s) falls as a
consumer learns more about s over time, which means that signal precision could
get better over time for a given M; and (3) when there are multiple risks resulting
from a decision, M depends on the determinant of the precision matrix |Var(s | Ki)−1|.
If risks and signals are independent, M is a product of posterior precisions: Π j (τsj +
bj− 2). Thus, increasing the precision of signals by acquiring more signals (by
processing more information) that are already precise (high bj−2) gets cheaper. This
explains a process of refined, less costly search. The amount of information M is
approximately the same as the number of binary signals that are necessary to
transmit information of the given precision (Sims 2003). Once the consumer knows
by the first binary signal where his/her decision outcomes are, he/she would know
which quartile the outcomes are in by the second signal, and so forth, because the
information M is measured in terms of the number of binary signals. If the outcomes
have a uniform distribution, each additional signal reduces the standard deviation
by half (increases the precision four-fold). This implies that the interpretation of the
second review depends on the first review and illustrates how existing reviews help
consumers interpret new reviews more effectively. The diminishing marginal cost
of precision can lead to multiple decisions. When the multiplicity of private signals
is removed from the cost concavity, multiple decisions may arise.
Information Markets and Buying Decisions
Consumers make choices based on the information they have. Most of the time this
information is incomplete and gathering more information involves frictions such
as time, effort, and money. Veldkamp (2006) suggested a modeling of information
frictions with the assumption that consumers can purchase signals from an
information market (e.g., Angieslist.com). In a typical information market, the
signal is supplied and sold after being discovered or generated by a producer. It is
not free because the discovery process is costly. Once discovered, the signal can be
replicated and sold to others. Because the producer is selling exact copies of the
same signal, it is a purely public signal (b = 0). Consumers choose a set Ji of signals
to purchase and observe.
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If they try to make decisions using the same strategy (in a symmetric equilibrium),
Var[𝑎̅ | Ki] = 0 and Cov[𝑎̅, s | Ki] = 0. Only Var[s | Ki] (the true state s) is uncertain.
However, if a consumer who learns less public information than others has a higher
Var[𝑎̅ | Ki], he/she would reduce by learning more. If a consumer who learns more
public information than others, he/she would not change Var[𝑎̅ | Ki] when r > 0
(Hellwig and Veldkamp 2009). In other words, when decisions are complementary,
public information is more valuable because the consumer can lower Var[𝑎̅ | Ki] by
using the information in estimating both the true state and others’ actions. This
implies that the marginal value of public information is bigger than the marginal
value of private information. However, observing one additional piece of public
information, beyond what other consumers have observed, is like observing private
information. It is in fact public because other consumers can also observe that piece
of information, but it is effectively private because other consumers have chosen
not to observe it. If other consumers observe that additional public information,
then observing the information has a higher marginal value because it reduces
Var[𝑎̅ | Ki]. Observing that public signal becomes a best strategy. If others choose
not to observe that additional signal, it is effectively a private signal and has lower
value. Therefore, the additional signal may not be valuable to observe.
Costly Precision and Buying Decisions
In this section, we consider signals with both public and private noise. First, as in
Myatt and Wallace (2012), suppose the amount of public (common) noise is
constant while consumers are allowed to choose private noise. Second, assume the
amount of private noise is constant while customers are allowed to vary the weight
their signal places on public noise. According to Myatt and Wallace (2012), a lower
coefficient bj is interpreted as “paying more attention” and a lower coefficient dj is
interpreted as “clarifying” signal j.
Such information choices have the following effects. First, more attention to signal
j (lower bj) reduces the conditional variance of the true state s, Var[s | Ki]. Lowering
bj has a larger effect on the conditional variance when dj is small (when both public
noise and private noise are weighted smaller) and lowering dj also has a greater
effect when bj is small. This means that paying more attention to signal j is valuable
when the signal is clear and that clearer signals are more valuable if a consumer can
pay close attention to them. Second, the covariance of this average action with the
true state s, Cov[𝑎̅, s | Ki], is proportional to Var[s | Ki]. Third, the conditional
variance of the average action, Var[𝑎̅ | Ki], depends on how consumers estimate
others’ signals and on the weight ϒj they place on the jth signal in actions. As a
consumer pays less and less attention to signal j (when bj gets larger), then signal j
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gets closer and closer to a private signal. This increases Var[𝑎̅ | Ki] (the degree of
uncertainty about 𝑎̅) because the consumer understands less and less of what signals
other consumers observe. As a consumer pays more and more attention to signal j
(when bj gets smaller), then signal j gets continually closer to a public signal. This
reduces Var[𝑎̅ | Ki] (the degree of uncertainty about 𝑎̅) because the consumer
understand more and more of what signals other consumers observe.
Proposition 2: Assume that a consumer's information costs are a function of the
sum of private precisions (costs increase as private precision increases). Then a
consumer who has precise private information about the product will make a buying
decision unconcerned about the reviews.
Now consider the case where, instead of holding d constant and choosing b, b is
held constant while allowing consumers to choose d. One way to describe this case
of information choice is that consumers choose from a variety of sites that provide
the equally good or bad reviews with some common noise, where some sites carry
a higher signal-to-noise ratio than others. In addition, consumers may introduce
independent signal-processing noise to whatever they observe, but they cannot
control this noise. In the previous section, the cost of information of the consumer
has been defined as c(d, b), which is decreasing in both arguments. This means that
as the weight on either the common signal noises or idiosyncratic noises increases,
the consumer's information cost decreases because they would be willing to spend
more time and effort on information acquisition.
Proposition 3: If c(d) is a convex function and r ∈ [0, 1] (that is, if a consumer's
information cost decreases as he/she leans more toward other consumers' reviews
and the reviews are complementary to her buying decision), then there is a unique
symmetric equilibrium in the choice of signal clarity d (that is, in extreme cases the
consumer may or may not follow the other consumers' reviews).
One might think that choosing d and choosing the number of reviews to observe
would cause similar problems. In addition, it is not the presence of private signal
noise that explains why buying decisions can be different among consumers even
after they observe the same reviews. Even if B = 0, Proposition 3 still holds because
consumers could choose different levels of clarity on the same reviews.
As for clarity versus quantity of a review, a consumer can break the signal from the
review into information that others care about and information they do not (for
example, brand versus price of a device). The information other consumers observe
has a different marginal utility for the consumer from the additional information
they have not observed. That difference creates the idiosyncrasies in utility and,
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hence, buying decisions. In the signal clarity problem, there is no such breakdown.
For example, if B = 0, then a consumer who observed two signals with different
degrees of clarity could infer the public noise p and the true state s accurately. In
addition, as the level of precision of private signal about the true state s increases,
it hides more about u and, thus, informs the consumer less about what other
consumers know and what they will do. In other words, it can raise Var[𝑎̅ | Ki]. A
consumer who acquires more information from the review would never forgo his/
her private signal and, therefore, would maintain a minimum level of 𝑎̅.
Consequently, more information would always increase expected utility.

CONCLUSION
Understanding the process of consumers' buying decisions is not intuitively obvious
from the way it appears. Before we come up with any acceptable account of the
process, we should understand more about consumers' traits as well as the
characteristics of the goods or services those consumers intend to purchase.
Consumers' buying decisions would be affected by many factors such as the types
of product and income elasticity of a product. Buying decisions would also be
influenced by personal traits, including susceptibility to assertions in product and
service marketing, budget constraints, sensitivity to the prices of goods or services,
prior knowledge of the purchase items, and information processing capacity.
Moreover, buying decisions could be affected by the properties of a consumer
review, such as depth, length, and the reviewer, per se. Recently, Netflix has
replaced its five star-based review system with a simple thumbs-up and thumbsdown because they believe a product gets more ratings when the reviewer has fewer
decision points (Fowler, 2017). According to Powell et al. (2017), consumers tend
to purchase a product based on the quantity of reviews, rather than the quality of
them.
Consumers' buying decision problems can also be formulated with information
choice. In other words, depending on the way that consumers choose and process
signals from the reviews, they may or may not make busying decisions in line with
the reviewers. That is, in economics term multiple equilibria can exist, although in
general, higher product ratings are associated with higher sales. Nevertheless, the
presence of multiple equilibria explains why not all consumers follow suit. This
implies that consumers get different signals from the same reviews that result in
different purchase decisions. The consumers observe different signals from the
same reviews and process them in different ways. Of the information choice
theories, inattentiveness is applicable to describing factual signals, such as expert
reviews, that can be known objectively and communicated easily. Browsing such
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reviews might require some time and effort, but they are not likely to be observed
with noise. Every consumer who observes that particular review knows that other
consumers have seen the same signal. Rational inattention is a useful way to
describe more subjective reviews—such as consumer reviews that might include
seemingly biased viewpoints or narrowly focused opinions—which are often
influenced by the number of decision points of the reviewer. Reasonable consumers
might come up with different conclusions on the same reviews. It might require
consumers to make more cognitive effort to improve their buying decisions. Yet
another information choice theory, information markets seems to be appropriate to
explain a situation where the signal may be incorrect (e.g., reviews on subscriptionbased review sites and sponsor content on media), but once a consumer see the
signals, he/she might know what was observed and he/she might also know that
other consumers observed the same thing. Finally, the costly precision theory
describes both the idea that the underlying signal may have error and that consumers
may disagree about how to interpret that signal. The level of disagreement in
interpreting the signal depends on the weight of the accuracy and clarity of the
signal a consumer takes into account at the time of signal processing. Considering
the information choice theories altogether, when consumers want to follow
decisions that other consumers have already made, they want to know what those
other consumers know.
However, consumers' buying decisions can be strategic substitutes depending on
the choice of signals to observe and the precision with which to observe those
signals. Thus, there are cases of "my way or the highway" buying decisions
depending on the consumer's information choice. When decisions are
complementarity, information choice theories can explain why the same reviews
can result in multiple different buying decisions. A recent study (von Helversen et
al. 2018) found that information choices could be different across age groups. The
study found that if making a purchase decision is difficult due to the trade-offs
between product attributes, younger adults tend to choose the higher-rated product.
A purchase decision based on higher rate, however, can be changed by a single
highly influential negative or positive review. On the other hands, older adults's
purchase decisions are more influenced by a single highly influential negative than
a powerful positive review. They do not take into account average consumer ratings
or single powerful positive reviews. The study suggests that consumers in different
age groups receive different signals from consumer reviews.
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